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How Constitutional Law Casebooks
Perpetuate the Myth ofJudicial Supremacy
Neal Devins

T

HE MoaE THINGS CHANGE,

the more

they stay the same.
In 1977, Henry Monaghan spoke
of the "widely held and deep belief' that
the study of constitutional law should be
undertaken through a 'aetailed examination of
Supreme Court decisions, albeit supplemented in varying degrees by authors' questions and law review excerpts:'1 With Burger
Court rulings on forced busing and abortion
rights fueling a nationwide debate over judicial
policymaking, the continuing vitality of this
case-centered approach seemed secure.
More than two decades later, Professor
Monaghans depiction of constitutional law
casebooks still rings true. Not only do
Supreme Court decisions remain the stuff of
the constitutional law course, casebook
authors - in providing context to Court deci-

sions - rarely venture outside the familiar terrain of academic commentary and author
questions. Likewise, as was the case in 1977,
the popular press still treats United States
Supreme Court rulings as definitive. For The
Washington Post's Joan Biskupic: "The Justices
are the final arbiter of what is in the Constitution;" for The New York Times' Linda Greenhouse: "[T]he Supreme Court [is] the
ultimate arbiter of constitutional boundaries:'2,
Unlike 1977, however, academics no longer
see the Supreme Court as the leading (let
alone ultimate) interpreter of the Constitution. Rather, academics now question the
Court's ability to effectuate social change
(some calling it a "hollow hope") and, as such,
call for the Court to issue "minimalist" decisions - decisions that allow popularly elected

Neal Devins is the Goodrich Professor of Law and Lecturer in Government at The College of William and
Mary.
I Henry P. Monaghan, Book Review, 90 HARV. 1. RBV. 1362, (1977).
2, Joan Biskupic, The Shrinking Docket, WASH. POST, March 18, 1996, at A15; Linda Greenhouse, Cases
Give Court Chance to Define Church and State, NY TIMBS, Sept. 19, 1999, at AI.
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government to playa leadership role in defining constitutional norms} Relatedly, by seeing
Court decisionmaking as the byproduct of
social and political forces, academics increasingly speak of the constitutional dialogues that
take place between the Supreme Court and
elected officials. 4 More striking, some academics speak either of "constitutional
moments" in which the people - through elections and the like - effectively amend the Constitution or of populist constitutionalist
discourse in which the courts would steer clear
of constitutional interpretation altogether. 5
The gulf between what academics say to
their colleagues (through scholarship) and
their students (through casebooks) is truly
remarkable. More to the point, one reason
why the myth of judicial supremacy persists is
that academics (who teach law students,
undergraduates, and - on occasion - journalists) do not practice what they preach. In the
pages that follow; I will sketch out some explanations for why it is that constitutional law
casebooks treat Supreme Court decisions as
final and definitive. Before doing so, however, I
will call attention to the myriad ways that the
elected branches shape constitutional values
(and how it is that constitutional law casebooks give short shrift to elected branch
influences).

Most landmark Supreme Court decisions
cannot be understood without first paying

attention to the politics surrounding them.6
What follows are seven explanations as to why
this is so:
First, Justices pay attention to politics in
crafting their decisions. John Marshall's
sequencing of merits and jurisdiction in Marbury v. Madison and Earl Warren's efforts at
crafting a unanimous opinion in Brown v.
Board of Education were both preemptive strikes
designed to limit the political repercussions of
unpopular decisions. Other examples include
Cooper v. Aaron (where the Supreme Court
declared itself "the ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution" after President Dwight Eisenhower secured compliance with court-ordered
desegregation by sending Army troops into
Little Rock) and the Steel Seizure case (where
the Courts willingness to invalidate President
Harry Truman's war-time seizure of the steel
mills was directly tied to public opinion).
Second, politics is informative in assessing
Supreme Court doctrine. Legislation limiting
the impact of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority speaks to whether, as the
Court held in Garcia, states' rights concerns
are adequately represented in Congress. Analysis of the decision to defer to military decisionmaking in Korematsu v. United States should
take into account that the internment of Japanese-Americans was a subterfuge devised by
the military and approved by the Justice
Department.
Third, political judgments shape Court
doctrine. In Brown v. Board, a highly influential
Solicitor General brief emphasized how segre-

3 See, e.g., Gerald N . Rosenberg, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991); Cass R. Sun stein, ONE CASE AT A TIME
(1999).
4 See, e.g., Robert G . McCloskey (revised by Sanford Levinson), THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT
(2d ed., 1994); Michael]. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L.
REv. I (1996); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. 1.. REv. 577 (1993).
5 Bruce Ackerman, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); Mark Tushnet, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
6 Lou Fisher and I have written a collection of twenty-five studies of the politics surrounding
landmark Court decisions. Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OP CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (2d ed. 1996). The examples that follow all come from that collection.
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gation undermined America's status as leader
of the free world and, as such, strengthened
Russia's hand in the Cold War.7 Even more
significant, Congress's choice to ground the
public accommodations section of the 1964
Civil Rights Act in the Commerce Clause
allowed the Court to treat Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States and Katzenbach v. McClung
as commerce cases. Likewise, by expanding
Justice Department authority in independent
counsel investigations, 1987 amendments to
the Ethics in Government Act proved critical
to Morrison v. Olson.
Fourth, politics contributes to the ultimate
meaning of Court action. The institutional
dynamics that made the legislative veto so
popular before I.N.S. v. Chadha explains why
the device continues to be used - well over
three hundred legislative vetoes have been put
into place since the decision. Likewise,
through funding and other restrictions, Court
decisions on abortion and school. busing were
undercut by Congress and the White House.
Moreover, the limits of Brown (where the
Court delegated its remedial authority to
Southern district court judges) are underscored by mid-sixties elected branch reforms
which resulted in more desegregation in 1965
than in the decade following Brown.
Fifth, populist resistance to Court decisionmaking often prompts the Court to recalibrate
its position. Public support of Roosevelt's
New Deal initiatives prompted the so-called
"switch in time" and, with it, the demise of the
Lochner Court. On abortion and school busing, elected branch disapproval may well have
contributed to the Rehnquist Courts moderation of Burger Court decisionmaking.
Sixth, even when the Court upholds governmental action, elected officials sometimes conclude that the Court was in error and that
7

corrective action is necessary. Wimess, for
example, Andrew Jacksons declaration that,
notwithstanding McCulloch v. Maryland, Congress was without authority to establish a
national bank. More recently, Court decisions
on women in the military, voting rights, and
homosexual sodomy have been neutered
through state and federal legislation.
And seventh, elected officials often spin
Court decisions in partisan ways. On war
powers, presidents have seized upon dicta in
Curtiss-Wright to assert plenary authority over
the decision to send troops into battle. On
affirmative action, President Bill Clinton proclaimed that a decision mandating strict SCtutiny review of race preferences did little more
than reaffirm the need for affirmative action.
The lesson here is simple (and one, I think,
that most authors of constitutional law texts
agree with): The practice of constitutional law
must take into account that constitutional
decisionmaking is the province of the elected
branches as well as the judiciary. Therefore,
good attorneys must be able to advance their
interests in both sectors. Sometimes the
courts will prove most responsive to a constitutional claim, but on many occasions constitutional claims are more effectively advanced
before legislative committees (where precedent-based arguments are often ineffective).
Even in court, especially the Supreme Court,
an advocate - at least some of the time should take socio-political context into
account.
Along these lines, the infusion of politics
into the constitutional law course seems
necessary, not simply a luxury. Exposure to
nonjudicial interpretation helps students
understand both Supreme Court decisionmaking and the critical role that elected
officials play in shaping constitutional values.

For similar reasons, the Solicitor General played a critical role in Korematsu. Here, however, the
Solicitor General perpetuated inequality by suppressing evidence suggesting that the internment
was rooted in racial bias, not military necessity.
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With so much scholarship now talking about
the Constitution outside of Court, moreover,
one would expect that recently published constitutional law texts would take nonjudicial
interpretations into account.
Think again. Constitutional law texts (even
those published in the past few years) pay
scant attention to nonjudicial interpretations.
Of the five leading texts I examined, only one
(coauthored by Paul Brest and Sandy
Levinson)8 treated nonjudicial interpretation
as an important part of the constitutional law
course. The other four 9 barely mention
nonjudicial interpretation. And even BrestLevinson was highly selective in its consideration of nonjudicial interpretation. None of
the five texts, for example, discusses elected
government resistance to court-ordered busing or IN.S. v. Chadha. None discusses the
government's briefs in Brown or Korematsu
(although two texts hint at government misrepresentations in Korematsu). None mentions
legislative action undertaken in response to
Court decisions on women in the military,
voting rights, and homosexual sodomy. None
mentions presidential interpretations of Court
decisions on affirmative action or war powers.IO None mentions that the Court's claim of
judicial exclusivity in Cooper occurred after
federal troops took over the Little Rock school
system. None sets out to demonstrate how it
is that politics entered into John Marshall's
decision in Marbury, although two of the
five provide substantial background material
about the political context of the decision.

None mentions public opposition to Trumans
seizing of the steel mills, although three of the
five contain some contextual information
about the seizure. Only one considers the
factual context of Brown. Only one mentions
legislative deliberations about grounding the
I964 Civil Rights Act in the Commerce
Clause. Only one mentions legislation enacted
in response to Garcia. Only two mention legislative efforts to undo Roe v. Wade (and both
only consider proposed human life legislation). To their credit, most of the books mention Roosevelt's court-packing proposal, the
pivotal role that Congress played in accelerating the pace of school desegregation, and
Andrew Jackson's claim that McCulloch was
wrongly decided. Overall, however, constitutional law texts do a poor to horrible job in
calling attention to the myriad ways that
elected officials shape constitutional values.1I

Why is it that casebook authors (some of
whom have made significant contributions to
the nonjudicial interpretation literature)
adhere to the traditionalist case and academic
commentary model? After all, the inclusion of
substantive nonjudicial materials makes the
constitutional law course both more accurate
and more useful. Moreover, since legal academics no longer defend judicial supremacy in their
scholarship, one would think that a retrofitting
of the constitutional law casebook would be a
welcome - even inevitable - development.

8 Brest & Levinson, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING (3d ed. 1992).
9 Gunther & Sullivan (13th ed. 1997); Lockhart et al. (8th ed. 1996); Stone et al. (3d ed. 1996); Farber
et al. (2d ed. 1998).
10 On war powers, however, all constitutional law texts contain some discussion of the War Powers
Resolution. Some texts, moreover, provide information on presidential implementation of the
Resolution.
11 Limitations in constitutional law texts will not always translate into limitations in the constitutional
law course. For example, some constitutional law professors may discuss the role of nonjudicial
interpretations in their classes. Most, however, will not consider the Constitution outside of courts.
Unlike other disciplines, law professors (especially professors of mainstream courses) typically build
their courses around the materials contained in comprehensive case books.
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Having coauthored a supplemental text on
the political dynamics of constitutional law (a
book whose sales would skyrocket if academics saw nonjudicial influences as critical to the
constitutional law course), I have thought
some about the stagnancy of constitutional
law texts. The simplest and, I suspect, most
accurate explanation for this phenomenon is
that old habits die hard. Law professors are
used to teaching from casebooks dedicated to
Supreme Court decisions and academic commentary. Casebook authors are used to writing such tomes. More to the point, most
casebook authors are schooled in the reading
of cases and academic commentary, not legislative and executive branch materials. Consequently, a significant retrofitting of an existing
casebook would take a tremendous amount of
time and energy. For a casebook author to
make such an investment, she would need to
be convinced (a) that it is the right thing to do,
(b) that she has the time to invest in such an
undertaking, (c) that her casebook would
need to include such material in order to lead
law professor~ to include it in their teaching,
and (d) that her market share will not be
harmed by such an investment. In other
words, before there is a fundamental change in
the constitutional law casebook, casebook
authors and their law professor constituents
must believe that nonjudicial interpretations
are central both to Supreme Court doctrine
and the practice of constitutional law. Indeed,
in order to overcome the burden of inertia,
professors of constitutional law would need to

think that it would be professional misconduct not to teach their students about nonjudicial interpretations.
Perhaps this transformation is inevitable.
The degree to which scholars now dismiss the
Supreme Court as the predominant source of
constitutional law prompted Mike Paulsen (in
responding to commentators on his paper on
executive branch power to interpret the Constitution) to ask: "Will nobody defend judicial
supremacy anymorer"12 Over time, casebook
authors - assuming the persistence of this
burgeoning scholarly consensus - might see
the incorporation of nonjudicial materials into
their texts as an idea whose time has come. 13
I think not, however. My suspicion, instead,
is that casebook authors will do little more
than expand upon the few pages they now
dedicate to the finality of Supreme Court decisions. In part, my skepticism is fueled by the
fact that law professors who write on this
topic focus on the legitimacy of nonjudicial
interpretation, not the nuts and bolts of how it
is that elected officials and the people shape
constitutional values. "Unfortunately," as
Sandy Levinson remarked, "there is no really
good comprehensive presentation of the constitutionallaw that is made by presidents, congress, administrative agencies, and ordinary
citizens in addition to that which is made by
the courts.,,14
But there are more deep seated reasons for
the persistence of the case and academic commentary model. The status of both casebook
authors and professors of constitutional law is

12 Michael Stokes Paulsen, Protestantism and Comparative Competence: A Reply to Professors Levinson and
Eisgruber, 83 GEO. L.J. 385, 385 ([994).
[3 Unlike [977-era authors of constitutional law texts, casebook authors today can access data sources
(Westlaw, Lexis, and the like) that make it relatively easy to incorporate nonjudicial materials into
their texts. Of course, as Gerry Rosenberg suggests, the thoughtful integration of political science
into constitutional law texts may require more time and energy than law professors seem willing to
invest. See Gerald Rosenberg, Across the Great Divide, 3 GREEN BAG 20 267 (2000). Law professors,
however, are skilled at preparing legislative histories and, consequently, are well positioned to
integrate nonjudicial interpretations into their texts.
[4 McCloskey, supra at 237.
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enhanced by adherence to the Court-centered
model. For law professors, the case and academic commentary model communicates that
that which they are expert in matters the most
in the teaching/practice of constitutional law.
Specifically, if the Supreme Court is seen as a
somewhat closed system (speaking the last
word on constitutional issues), the language of
lawyers becomes the language of constitutional law. In contrast, were the decisions of
the Supreme Court seen as part of a broader
socio-political mosaic, lawyer training and,
with it, law professor expertise would matter
less. Consequently, constitutional law casebooks are a celebration of what law professors
were trained to do (read cases and write briefs)
and what law professors do in their scholarship (write academic commentary - much of
which assesses Supreme Court decisionmaking). For law professor authors of these casebooks, their status is similarly enhanced by the
current regime. The case and academic commentary model validates both their lawyer
training and their scholarship. Moreover, in
selecting what academic writings are worth
including in constitutional law texts, the case
and commentary model enables casebook
authors to serve as gatekeepers of academic
writing and thereby enhances their status vis-

a-vis other professors of constitutionallaw. ls
In saying that the case and academic commentary model maximizes the status of constitutional law professors, I do not mean to
suggest that there is a conscious conspiracy
within the legal academic community to perpetuate the myth of judicial supremacy. Most
law professors see the teaching of doctrine as
their principal duty to their students and, as
such, are reluctant to sacrifice the teaching of
doctrine in order to make room for politics. In
constitutional law; this is especially true.
There is too much to cover in the course and,
consequently, most of us have to eliminate
cases that we consider monumentally important. Nevertheless, if judicial supremacy is a
myth, professors of constitutional law should
readily trade off the teaching of some doctrine.
In particular, to the extent that politics
explains doctrine, exposure to a cases sociopolitical setting is necessary to the teaching of
doctrine. 16 For this reason, the line separating
a commitment to only teaching landmark
Supreme Court decisions from a deep seated
belief in judicial supremacy is, at least, blurred.

The constitutional law casebook, while des-

15 At first blush, this analysis suggests that constitutional law texts written by and marketed to

political scientists would pay considerably more attention to nonjudicial interpretation than law
school texts. But it is also possible that the political science marketplace is affected by an incentive
scheme that closely resembles the legal academic marketplace. For example, it may be that the
political scientists who write constitutional law texts (and the professors who teach from these
texts) see the reading of cases as a skill which separates them from their colleagues (who teach and
write about Congress and the Presiden cy).
16 In this and other ways, the incorporation of nonjudicial materials does not stand in the way of the
teaching of doctrine. My students, for the most part, are better able to understand a decision when
they have a better sense of the case's socio-political context. For some students, learning about
context makes them more interested in the case; for other students, learning about context helps
them understand the Court's reasoning. Accordingly, I think Suzanna Sherry is wrong when she
claims that the teaching of nonjudicial materials diverts a student's attention away from the "law" in
constitutional law. See Suzanna Sherry, The Law Professor as Schizophrenic, 3 GRBEN BAG 20 273
(2 000) . For identical reasons, Sherry goes too far in equating the teaching of nonjudicial materials
(something which is inextricably linked to doctrine) with the teaching of game theory, comparative
constitutional law, and the like (something which is "interesting and relevant").
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perately in need of a retooling, is likely to
remain more-or-less the same. The burden of
inertia and the status of legal academics both
speak to the perpetuation of the case and academic commentary model. With that said, the
more academics talk and write about the pivotal role that elected officials and the people
play in shaping constitutional values, the more
likely it is that (over time) the teaching of nonjudicial interpretation will be considered a
necessary component of the constitutional law
course.
My focus, of course, has been on the constitutionallaw course. But limitations in the case

17

and academic commentary model apply to
other subjects. Yet, like constitutional law; the
case and academic commentary model persists
(for reasons of inertia and self interest). Unless
and until casebook editors replace some case
material with expository text in order to make
way for substantial excerpts from nonlegal
sources, legal education will be somewhat
inefficient and incomplete.17 Admittedly, the
choice of which cases to cut and which nonjudicial sources to add is extraordinarily difficult.
But the critical importance of nonjudicial materials to legal training suggests that casebook
editors at least try to innovate their texts. /!JB

Doug Laycock makes this point in Reflection5 on Two Theme5: Teaching Religiou5 Liberty and Evolutionary
Change5 in Ca5eboolu, 101 HARV. L. RBv. 1642,1652-54 (1988). For an example of a constitutional law
casebook written by a political scientist that makes use of expository text this way, see Louis Fisher,
AMBRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
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